Highlights & Insights Archive: September - October 2009

It's Not Over Yet (10/31/09) "Confusion" is the single word that best characterizes the current status of talks over Iran's nuclear program. The New York Times reported on Thursday night that Iran had essentially rejected the plan to transfer roughly 80 percent of its uranium abroad for conversion. Iran delivered its response to the IAEA orally, however, creating uncertainty about its official stance. France and the United States have called for Iran to put this week's response in writing, but Iran says that the oral response does not constitute its final, "official" response. An official response is supposedly pending in which Iran will propose changes to the plan - not reject a deal altogether. These changes may include simultaneous swaps of Iran's LEU for fuel already fabricated to serve the Tehran research reactor (see today's LA Times). Diplomats and commentators in the West, though, say that such an arrangement would undermine the whole point of the deal, which is to reduce Iran's stock of uranium that could be used to build a nuclear bomb in the short-term. The delay is, of course, also buttressing those who believe Iran is up to its old tricks. A commentary on TehranBureau.com suggests that Iran wants to string along President Obama until he is forced to take a belligerent line reminiscent of George W. Bush - a development the regime would consider politically advantageous.

No News Is...Bad News? (10/26/09) Friday's "deadline" for Iran to accept a uranium deal has come and gone without an answer from Tehran. The government of Iran is very likely split over whether to accept the IAEA plan that would transfer most of Iran's uranium abroad for conversion to a form suitable for medical applications; the uranium would be returned to Iran in late 2010, buying a year for diplomacy to bear additional fruit. Not all Iranians are confident in the good faith of the West and its partners, however. Majlis Speaker and former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani has suggested that the US and its allies are trying to dupe Iran into giving up its nuclear fuel. An alternative plan being discussed in Iran is the simple purchase from abroad of the uranium fuel rods that it needs for its medical reactor. Though this option may be preferable to some officials of the Islamic Republic, Iran would have to find a willing seller - which may be difficult if Tehran pulls completely out of the transfer deal at the eleventh hour. Should Iranian proponents of the transfer deal fail to sell the current package to the top decision-makers in Tehran, look for a hybrid counter-proposal that might involve shipment of a smaller portion of Iran's uranium and purchase of the balance from a foreign supplier. Tehran has said to expect an answer in the next week. Meanwhile, IAEA inspectors began a three-day visit yesterday to the Fardo nuclear facility near Qom. Results from the inspection will probably take a few weeks to be made public. See Current News Links for coverage of both of these issues.

The Weekend Ahead (10/23/09) This weekend is to be book-ended by significant events. Tehran is supposed to decide today (Friday) whether or not it will accept the uranium deal worked out by diplomats this week in Vienna. On Sunday, international inspectors will visit the recently revealed nuclear facility near Qom. US-Iran-Relations.com has to take the weekend off from daily updates for travel purposes, but will be back Monday with full coverage of the weekend's events. In the meantime, you can use 'Special Links' to keep up with developments in real time. Also, be sure to read the wealth of interesting links under today's Current News Links.

New Editorial: Why Fareed Zakaria Is Wrong About Iran (10/20/09) Fareed Zakaria thinks that engagement is a fundamentally flawed endeavor because the Iranian regime is committed to an anti-American posture. Yet Zakaria ignores evidence to the contrary. Read the latest US-Iran-Relations.com editorial here.

New Poll of American Attitudes toward Iran (10/19/09) A new Washington Post-ABC News public opinion poll reinforces the findings of an October 6th poll by the Pew Research Center suggesting a hawkish American outlook on Iran. Though Americans overwhelmingly support talks (82 percent) as a first step to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, they likewise overwhelmingly support sanctions (78 percent). Forty-two percent favor bombing Iran's nuclear sites. Perhaps most remarkably, one in three Americans (33 percent) favors a ground invasion of Iran to remove the government from power. Though Republicans tend to be more hawkish than Democrats, the partisan differences are not extreme; of those favoring regime change through invasion, 32 percent are Democrats, 40 percent are Republicans, and 30 percent are self-described Independents. These trends suggest the Obama Administration faces a dual challenge. It must not only negotiate a solution acceptable to several governments, but one that it can sell to a skeptical domestic audience. The late and renowned political scientist Alexander George argued that foreign policy in the United States requires "policy legitimacy" to succeed. The American electorate must believe that a policy is both feasible and desirable. Unfortunately, the American electorate tends to be impatient and unappreciative of nuance. This, according to George, is what led to the failure of the policy of Detente with the Soviet Union. The American people were too used to viewing the Soviets as an irredeemable enemy. They also lacked the patience to support a policy that would require time to bear fruit. Detente sought to transform the nature of the Soviet-American relationship to one of reduced tension and practical cooperation. It sought to socialize the USSR to international norms so that the Soviets would effectively "contain" themselves through better behavior. Clearly such a transformation cannot happen overnight. President Obama appears inclined to achieve detente with the Islamic Republic. Can he maintain "policy legitimacy" for a sufficient amount of time? The polling numbers do not bode well. Though no analogy is perfect, the ghosts of 1970s Detente loom.

Talks Today on Transfer of Uranium out of Iran (10/19/09) Diplomats from Iran, the United States, Russia, and France are meeting at the IAEA in Vienna today to discuss the technical aspects of a potential deal to transfer Iranian uranium out of the country for further enrichment and conversion; the uranium would eventually be returned to Iran in a form suitable for peaceful applications. Assuming Iran does not have a significant stash of secret uranium, this could increase by one year the amount of time it would take Iran to build a nuclear bomb, thereby building confidence regarding Iran's short-term intentions and buying time for diplomacy. The following is excerpted from Michael Adler's article in The Daily Beast:

The bright side is what the United States and other major powers are going for in Vienna. They want Iran to send some 80 percent of the uranium it has enriched out of the country. It would go to Russia to be refined further and then to France to be made into fuel for the Tehran research reactor that makes radio-isotopes used for medical procedures. The fuel Argentina gave Iran for this reactor in 1993 is running out.

If Iran follows through with the deal, it would no longer have enough enriched uranium to make an atomic weapon. For now, that is. Iran continues to enrich, although only to low levels of 3.5 percent, well below the 90 percent highly enriched levels needed for nuclear weapons. Iran would be able in about a year, depending on how many centrifuges it used, to re-stock, up to the 1,500 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) it currently has. This figure is also the number of kilograms needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to make one bomb.

Iran’s shipping out 1,200 kilograms of LEU would be a confidence-building measure to show the world powers that it is serious about allaying fears it seeks nuclear weapons. It would re-set the clock since Iran would not be an immediate threat to make a bomb while its stockpile remained low.

New Resources Added (10/12/09) Two new links have been added to the website under Special Links. Press TV is Iran's first international news network. It broadcasts twenty-four hours per day in English from its Tehran headquarters and has a very impressive and user-friendly website. Gulf/2000 is a project of Columbia University. It is led by Professor Gary Sick, a widely-respected Iran expert and former National Security Council official. It provides a wealth of links relevant to Iran and US-Iran relations. US-IRAN-RELATIONS.COM is proud to be listed among Gulf/2000's top Iran resources!

Poll Shows Americans Hawkish on Iran (10/7/09) A new poll released yesterday by the Pew Research Center suggests that a sizable majority of Americans favors the use of military force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. If given the choice between a nuclear Iran and war, Americans choose war by a large margin. Sixty-one percent believe that it is worth taking military action to stop an Iranian Bomb, while only 24 percent believe that the US should avoid war with Iran, even if it means that Iran would acquire a nuclear weapon. Interestingly, Americans across the political spectrum favor this hawkish stance, including just over half of Democrats. Americans are not in a rush to war, however. Sixty-three percent favor the direct negotiations currently underway, but 64 percent doubt they will work, suggesting most Americans view talks as a necessary precursor to more forceful action. Democrats are more likely than Republicans or Independents to believe that talks can work. Americans also look favorably upon sanctions. A very strong majority (78 percent) favors tougher sanctions on Iran. Curiously, 56 percent say that sanctions will not prevent Iran from acquiring The Bomb. So why do Americans support them? Is it because they seek to punish Iran for punishment's sake? Are sanctions, like talks, just another step in setting the table for military action? Finally, only 41 percent of respondents consider themselves to be well-informed on the issue. According to Pew, the more informed the respondent claims to be (or the more they claim to have heard), the more hawkish they are. There are obvious measurement problems here: how can you trust one's own assessment of their level of knowledge on an issue? There are a few possible meanings of this category of data. First, respondents may reflect the hawkish nature of American media. The more hawkish news and analysis that one consumes, the more likely one may be to be influenced by it. Second, it may suggest that a hawkish stance is indeed objectively the best position to take, and that the more informed one becomes, the more clearly one sees this. Finally, it may reflect naive epistemology among those with hawkish positions. That is to say: people may think they are well-informed when they reach conclusions but they may in fact not be. So what does all of this mean? Any way you slice it, the data from the poll suggests that "hawks" are winning the debate in American public discourse on Iran.

Diplomacy Off to Positive Start (10/5/09) "Cautious optimism" best characterizes the tone after talks last week between Iran and the US/P5+1. Iran agreed to open its recently-revealed nuclear facility near Qom to international inspection; an IAEA inspection will occur on October 25th. A more surprising and compelling development is Iran's agreement in principle to ship a large portion of its declared low-enriched uranium stockpile to Russia and/or France for enrichment to a level suitable for medical applications. Assuming no large, undeclared stockpile of enriched uranium, this would limit any Iranian nuclear-weapons breakout potential and be a major confidence-builder, allowing extra time for talks to achieve a more substantive solution to the overall nuclear dispute. Technical talks on such a transfer will occur on October 19th. Finally, Iran and the P5+1 have agreed to meet again before the end of the month to pick up where things left off on Thursday. The picture is not entirely rosey, however. While US officials have expressed optimism, they continue to warn that talks cannot continue indefinitely, and Congress remains poised to act on sanctions if progress stalls. One development over the weekend may especially militate against Western patience. An article in Sunday's New York Times discusses an IAEA report that Iran has "sufficient information" to design and build a nuclear warhead. Though the authors of the report claim the conclusions are tentative, this revelation may add significant fuel to the fire of a lingering debate within public discourse and among intelligence agencies over Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities.

Live Television Interview (9/30/09) Watch Chris Ferrero, creator and editor of US-Iran-Relations.com, discuss Iran and the P5+1 talks on international television with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's News Breakfast program. The interview will air live shortly after 6 a.m. Friday in Melbourne/ 4 p.m. Thursday on the US East Coast. It will air in 44 countries on the Australia Network. You may also watch streaming online video here.

New Editorial: Nuclear Focus May Doom Talks (9/30/09) The much-anticipated talks between Iran and the US/P5+1 begin tomorrow. The prospects for success are not good. The US and its allies appear more willing to incur the costs of coercing Iran than the costs of compromising with it. Broadening the scope of talks beyond nuclear weapons could lessen the political costs of a deal, but the West is wholly focused on the nuclear issue. Meanwhile, Iran is not helping matters by being vague about what it seeks -- even though its likely terms are there for all to see. Read what all of this means in the new US-Iran-Relations.com editorial.

The (In)Significance of Iran's Missile Tests (9/28/09) Iran has made headlines the last couple of days with the launch of several ballistic missiles. Media have described the launches as heightening tensions. Yet to treat them as such is to give them more attention than they probably deserve - or at least the wrong kind of attention. Their likely intended audiences are the Iranian and international publics; such demonstrations of power are a way to shore up national pride and perhaps instill fear in foreign publics who may pressure their own governments to take a softer line. The Tondar, Fateh, and Shahab missiles have been known to Western intelligence agencies for years. The Shahab-3 has been Iran's premier missile; it is ostensibly capable of striking Israel with a nuclear warhead (presuming, of course, that Iran could develop a nuclear warhead to fit on top of it). Iran has been attempting to improve the accuracy, range, and payload capabilities of the Shahab-3; as such, today's launch may reveal important new features or capabilities. Yet of far more interest are the test results of Iran's newer solid-fuel missiles such as the Sejil.

The strategic utility of Iran's ballistic missile arsenal has long been limited by its reliance on liquid-fuel missiles such as the Shahab-3. Launches of liquid-fuel missiles, especially large ones, are significantly easier to detect and pre-empt than those of solid-fuel missiles. Liquid fuel is highly volatile. One cannot transport missiles loaded with liquid fuel; the fuel must be transported separately and loaded into the missile at the launch site. This process can take 2-3 hours. Missile crews can try to camouflage their activities, but Iran's topography makes this difficult. Thus, in a crisis situation, it is quite likely that the US would be able to detect and pre-empt a mobile Shahab-3 launch. Iran could place liquid-fuel missiles in silos or on hidden stationary platforms, but it would thereby sacrifice mobility.

In contrast to liquid-fuel missiles, solid-fuel missiles do not require launch-site fueling. They can thus be launched more quickly (20-30 minutes) and carry less risk of detection and preemption. (A pre-fueled missile also requires fewer support trucks, which further reduces the risk of detection compared to the relatively large entourage that a liquid-fuel missile requires.) A truly significant demonstration of Iran's missile capability, therefore, would be repeated, successful tests of solid-fuel systems. Readers can rest assured that Western Intelligence is paying greatest attention to the launch results of the Sejil, one such solid-fuel missile recently introduced into Iran's arsenal. A transition to solid-fuel systems would be a major step in the evolution of Iran's strategic missile forces. This, not made-for-TV launches of short-range rockets, would be a development worthy of headlines and concern.

Iran Has Secret Nuclear Facility (9/25/09) President Obama, flanked by the leaders of France and the United Kingdom, made a statement this morning accusing Iran of maintaining a secret nuclear facility near the holy city of Qom (view stories here). Iran, its cover apparently having been blown, has duly reported to the IAEA that it is building a second uranium enrichment facility. Will this "gotcha moment" help bring about Iranian acquiescence to a bargain, or will it only serve to harden Iran's position and resistance? It is too soon to tell. Stay tuned.

Ahmadinejad at the UN (9/24/09) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York last night. View the video of his full address and read reports and reaction on the Current News Links page. Read President Obama's remarks to the UN here.

Should the US Threaten Israel? (9/23/09) Zbig Brzezinski made quite a splash in an interview with the Daily Beast earlier this week in which he suggested the US should threaten to shoot down any Israeli jets that may attempt to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Is Brzezinski crazy? Not necessarily. He seemed to advocate not an explicit – but an implied threat that would apply to anyone that might violate certain airspace. This would ostensibly be done by modifying air defense SOPs to ensure a more rapid and automatic response to airspace encroachments, thereby elevating the risk of an ‘accident.’ Tying one’s hands to a certain course of action and being able to claim loss of control (in other words, creating ‘automaticity’) is a standard way to make incredible threats appear more credible. This, in turn, can have a deterrent effect. It would not be very credible if the US told Israel it would take the initiative to shoot down its planes. Yet it would be more credible if the US warned Israel that it was implementing new SOPs for regional air defense based on automaticity that could result in an ‘unfortunate accident.’ It would give Israel the burden of the initiative and add another element of risk to the Israeli calculus. This is, in all likelihood, what Brzezinski meant.

New Editorial: Taking Iran's Proposal Seriously (9/21/09) Today's edition of the Washington Post carries an op-ed by former Senators Dan Coats and Charles Robb and retired General Charles Wald arguing that upcoming negotiations must constitute Iran's "last chance." According to the authors, the United States cannot expend time "on Iranian stalling tactics, if this is indeed what this overture is." But what if this overture is more than mere stalling tactics? The US is of course wise to suspect that Iran may be stalling, but it would be potentially short-sighted to dismiss the Iranian proposal out of hand. The authors' caveat "if this is indeed what this overture is" suggests that even they, intuitively, know that the Iranian proposal may be worth a serious look. It is indeed plausible that Iran is seeking a major rapprochement with the United States. Read the case for this possibility in the new US-Iran-Relations.com editorial: "Is Iran Angling for a Grand Bargain?"

Quds Day Rallies an Opportunity for Opposition (9/18/09) Today is "Quds Day" in Iran - an annual, government-sponsored event in which Iranians rally to express solidarity with the Palestinians and condemn the 'Zionist occupation' of Jerusalem. But Opposition leaders have called on Iranians to use this Quds Day as an opportunity to rally against the oppression and misdeeds of their own government. Street clashes have been reported between pro- and anti-government marchers. Mir Hossein Mousavi and former President Khatami are even reported to have been roughed-up. See Current News Links for more.

"Our Disputes Are Not So Deep" (9/17/09) Defeated presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi appears in Western media to be a model of resistance to the Iranian regime. But this recent LA Times interview with him suggests caution in assuming that stark political divisions can be exploited to stop Iran's nuclear program or even overthrow the regime. The Iranian Opposition is not pining for outside support, nor is it taking the Western side in the nuclear dispute. Iran's internal divisions are certainly real, but they do not necessarily carry over to foreign policy issues. Caution is advised before assuming otherwise.

Iran's Proposal Could Be Worth Taking Seriously (9/16/09) There is no shortage of scorn in American public discourse for the recent Iranian proposal for negotiations. Most dismiss it as naive, unserious, or subterfuge. But a meandering proposal that is heavy on rhetoric and short on details does not necessarily imply an unserious proposal. In fact, it may even be expected from a country that specializes in "taarof," an Iranian social and cultural code of interaction and negotiation that involves flowery language, expectations of deference, implication, and sheer disingenuousness. See Roger Cohen's column in today's New York Times, and stay tuned for a US-Iran-Relations.com editorial exploring the possibility that Iran is actually seeking a grand bargain with the Great Satan (but won't come out and say it explicitly).

Reminder: New Editorial on US Objectives (9/15/09) There has been a flurry of activity on US-Iran-Relations.com over the last few days. Amidst all of the changes and additions, be sure to read the new editorial explaining why the US should reconsider its main objectives vis-a-vis Iran. Feedback is encouraged.

New Protests Later This Week? (9/15/09) The dial is turning back up on domestic political tensions in Iran, as regime members have called for the arrest of presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi. Karroubi continues to assert that political prisoners were raped in prison after this summer's protests. A judicial panel dismissed the charges this week. Meanwhile, Ayatollah Montazeri - probably the most beloved cleric in Iran - has accused the Islamic Republic of becoming a 'military regime.' Watch for possible street protests on Friday and even a high-profile arrest.

Negotiations to Begin in October (9/14/09) The chief headline today is the decision by Iran and the P5+1 to begin talks in October. Location is TBD. President Ahmadinejad reiterated yesterday, however, that uranium enrichment will not be on the agenda. The US is certain to raise the issue nonetheless. Disagreement about the agenda is never a promising way to begin talks. See Current News Links for more.

Iranian Proposal for Comprehensive Negotiations (9/14/09) Read Iran's proposal for talks here.

Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act (9/13/09) Track the status in Congress of the widely-discussed Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act here. The bill is currently in committee. The link will be deposited for future reference under "Official Documents and Links" - Sanctions.

You Go First; No - You Go First (9/13/09) Readers may be forgiven for feeling a bit confused by the first three headlines in today's Current News Links. Iran is ready to talk about its nuclear program. Iran may be willing to talk about its nuclear program. Iran will not compromise on its nuclear program. It smacks of nuclear Goldilocks - or perhaps Brett Favre is running the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Yet there is a simple explanation: Iran wants some significant concessions within a larger negotiating framework before it seriously negotiates any nuclear concessions of its own. This has been a persistent problem holding back US-Iran rapprochement for years; each side usually wants the other to go first - and to do more than it is ready to do. In recent years, the Bush administration conditioned talks on suspension of uranium enrichment. And throughout its short history, the Islamic Republic has often sought major American gestures prior to or in exchange for relatively modest gestures of its own. For example, Iran was disappointed that the US did not rapidly pursue normalized relations in the early 90s in exchange for Iran's help releasing the remaining hostages in Lebanon (see Ken Pollack's book The Persian Puzzle). Iran has also spoken repeatedly of American "respect" for the Islamic Republic, however that is to be manifested, as a pre-requisite of rapprochement. In theory, Iran probably is ready to make some nuclear concessions - but only after it has first secured some symbolic and tangible concessions from America and the West. These would most likely include an explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Iranian regime, assurance of a prominent Iranian role in Persian Gulf security affairs, and perhaps even the removal of sanctions. This is likely what Foreign Minister Mottaki means when he speaks of the time eventually being "ripe" for nuclear talks. In other words, he is telling the West: "You go first."

New Editorial Posted (9/12/09) US-Iran-Relations.com has posted the first opinion piece of its new Editorial series. Click the new 'Editorials/Commentary' link on the menu bar or click here to read why it is time for the US to reconsider its main objective in Iran.

Welcome to US-Iran-Relations.com 2.0 (9/12/09) The site has reached a new stage in its evolution three months after its founding. Two new features have been added in order to facilitate the production and sharing of more original content. US-Iran-Relations.com now offers three 'levels' of original content: Highlights and Insights, Editorials and Commentary, and In-Depth Analysis. 'Original Analysis' is now 'In-Depth Analysis;' this page will remain home to the most thorough and probing analysis on the site. The new 'Editorials and Commentary' section offers shorter, usually more opinionated pieces of roughly 600-1,000 words. Readers are encouraged to submit op-ed commentaries for publication. Both in-depth analyses and editorials will be posted on an ad hoc basis. Finally, the biggest change to the site is the new home page featuring 'Highlights and Insights.' This page will most resemble a standard "blog" (a word that US-Iran-Relations.com generally prefers not to use to describe itself). Website founder and editor Chris Ferrero will present a thread of paragraph-length comments and insights about news and developments in US-Iran relations. The page will also highlight major news stories from 'Current News Links' and direct users to new links and features in lieu of the 'News and Updates' column that used to reside on the left side of site. Please feel free to provide feedback! Thank you.