Why Fareed Zakaria Is Wrong About Iran

US-Iran-Relations.com Editorial

October 20, 2009

Fareed Zakaria again demonstrates why he is among the most widely respected voices in public discourse of foreign affairs in the October 12 issue of Newsweek (Containing a Nuclear Iran by Fareed Zakaria). Mr. Zakaria presents a clear, systematic analysis of policy options toward Iran. He examines three approaches: armed conflict, engagement, and the middle ground of containment. Ultimately, he settles on containment as the optimal choice. Yet articulate and insightful as he may be, not even Fareed Zakaria is right all the time. Unfortunately, Mr. Zakaria’s analysis suffers from a fundamental flaw which leads him to prematurely dismiss the potential for engagement.

Zakaria acknowledges some merits of the pro-engagement argument. For example, Iran lives in a tough neighborhood, has legitimate security concerns and interests, and has been targeted by regime change sentiment (if not policy). Moreover, the US has never made a truly concerted effort to achieve a genuine rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. The potential of engagement, in other words, has never been fully tapped. Zakaria concludes, however, that the pro-engagement argument is flawed. Engagement cannot achieve any worthwhile détente or rapprochement because the very identity and legitimacy of the Iranian regime rests on anti-Americanism. Says Zakaria:

“I do not believe the Iranian regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with America. Isolation from the West and hostility toward the United States are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime – the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day…If it is true that Washington has been wary of simply getting into talks with Tehran, the reverse is more evidently true.”

Zakaria’s reasoning reflects conventional wisdom; this author himself once believed the same thing. It also demonstrates logical thought – albeit bounded logical thought (bounded in that additional information could change the ‘logical’ conclusion). If positive relations with America are inimical to Iran’s identity and/or would undercut the political legitimacy of the theocracy, then engagement is a fool’s endeavor. It would be akin to misdiagnosing an illness and trying in vain to treat it with a medicine (engagement) that will never work. If Iran is fundamentally and irredeemably opposed to the US, why bother with engagement?

It may be a logical conclusion, but it is one that fails to stand up to empirical scrutiny. There is indeed evidence that Iran is open to a mending of US-Iran relations. Mr. Zakaria, for some reason, omits this evidence from his analysis. Readers of US-IRAN-RELATIONS.COM are probably by now well aware of Iran’s offer to the United States in 2003 for a “grand bargain,” in which it would have made major concessions on all issues of importance to the US in exchange for “mutual respect,” removal of sanctions, and a central role in regional political and security affairs. It was and remains the boldest gesture that either side has made during the thirty-year US-Iran cold war. Whether the offer was motivated by Iranian fear of a US invasion is irrelevant – the point is that conservative Supreme Leader Khamenei (not merely President Khatami) laid it all on the table. Skeptics thought the offer may have been a disingenuous ploy to buy time, but its scope shattered taboos and barriers and went far beyond what would seem necessary to cynically buy time. Besides, if its intention was to disingenuously stave off Bush administration hostility, it failed miserably. The proposal was dead on arrival for reasons mainly attributable to domestic American politics.

The Iranian regime has changed since 2003. It is more conservative and hard-line, yet Khamenei remains Supreme Leader, and a country’s fundamental interests rarely change in six years. “President” Ahmadinejad recently said that Iran remains open to having positive relations with all countries except Israel. This brings us back to Zakaria. If opposition to any one country is a fixture of the identity and legitimacy of the Iranian theocracy, it is opposition to Israel – not the United States. But even this is debatable. Though Iran needs to maintain the appearance of opposition to Israel in order to buttress its standing in the Middle East and Islamic world, it has shown a willingness to quietly cooperate with and achieve a modus vivendi with even the “Zionist entity.” Trita Parsi reveals in his eye-opening 2007 book Treacherous Alliance that concurrent with its proposal to the United States in 2003, Iran put out feelers to Israel for a deal and an understanding that would create a cold peace. Former IRGC commander and 2009 presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai was behind the plan to adopt what is called the Pakistani/Malaysian Model in Iranian foreign policy. According to this model, Iran would significantly moderate its opposition to Israel and Arab-Israeli peace, especially and most significantly in material terms. It would cease material support for armed movements against Israel and dissuade Hezbollah, et al, from provoking Israel. Iran would not establish diplomatic ties with Israel, and it would continue to criticize Israel from afar. In effect, Iranian opposition to Israel would still be principled but would be designed to minimize any actual threat to Israel while preserving the Islamic Republic’s identity and legitimacy. In exchange, Israel would support US-Iran rapprochement and a more central role for Iran in Middle East affairs. The proposal enjoyed the support of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and even, reportedly, Supreme Leader Khamenei. It also intrigued elements in Israel. Yet the new model of “opposition” to Israel died with the larger proposal for rapprochement with the US.

For some reason, Iran’s efforts to reach out to the US and even Israel have failed to make it into the mainstream of American public discourse about US-Iran relations. We are led to accept the conventional wisdom that Iran is irreconcilable to the West and especially to Israel. This conventional wisdom is sometimes reflected in the writing of men as erudite as Fareed Zakaria. Perhaps Mr. Zakaria is aware of Iran’s gestures and has nonetheless reached his conclusion for other reasons; no writer can map his entire thought process in a magazine article or op-ed. He does make a cursory economic argument for why Iran would shy away from rapprochement. Though compelling, it is insufficient. One can only judge him on what he has written, and Mr. Zakaria fails to weigh important evidence that would question his conclusion about the possibilities of engagement. Zakaria may ultimately be right; containment may be the way to go. If Iran rebuffs good faith negotiating efforts that take its interests into account, firmer action should be taken. But the US and its allies should not adopt this posture prematurely. Engagement is not hopeless. Despite all the lip service given to exhausting diplomacy, the US has not yet tapped engagement for all it may be worth.