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INFORMING, INSPIRING, AND ELEVATING PUBLIC DISCOURSE
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The More Things Change... (2/28/10) It has been a relatively quiet few weeks in Iran since the Islamic Revolution's anniversary. The occasion was supposed to serve as the next chapter in the Green Movement's inexorable march. Instead, it was largely a dud, and the regime for all intents and purposes appears to have snuffed out the street protests and asserted control. Mir Hossein Mousavi spoke out boldly this weekend, calling the government a dictatorial cult that has distorted the Islamic Revolution (see Current News Links for stories). He deserves credit given the risks to him and his family (one relative has already paid the ultimate price). Yet Mousavi has not articulated any bold strategy that would appear to significantly challenge or threaten those in power in the near term. Instead, Mousavi says that the Green Movement's main strategy is fostering public awareness. He seems to accept that reform of Iran's system will be gradual, as forecast in the US-Iran-Relations.com analysis Evolution, Not Revolution. This has important implications for US policy. The US may prefer to wait things out and avoid the moral unsavoriness of dealing with Iran's current leaders, but this is looking less and less like a realistic option. Meanwhile, the old fall-back strategy of sanctions looks less and less potent. China continues to hold out on new United Nations sanctions, and Russia intimated this week that it may not be on board with crippling sanctions, either. It is plausible that both could abstain from a UN vote, thus allowing a new sanctions resolution to pass. But passing sanctions resolutions or laws is not enough - implementation and enforcement is what matters. So we appear to be left about where we always find ourselves. Iran is moving forward with its nuclear program, the regime looks relatively secure, and the US is spinning its wheels trying to win support for truly effective multilateral sanctions. As argued regularly on this website, the US must broaden its thinking and become more creative in dealing with Iran. One option is to adopt a model similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as explained in the US-Iran-Relations.com editorial analysis A Helsinki Process for Iran?. This framework successfully addressed both geopolitical and human rights concerns with the Soviet Union. An adaptation may work equally well in dealing with both geopolitical and human rights concerns in Iran. Trying to garner support for crippling sanctions and/or waiting for the Green Movement to achieve victory are not the only options, and cooperating with Iran's current leadership does not necessarily imply selling out the reformers. Following the US-Iran relationship feels increasingly like the life of Bill Murray's character in the movie Groundhog Day, who lives the same day over and over again. If the US wants to see actual, constructive change on Iran matters and break out of this Groundhog Day-like condition, it ought to start thinking seriously about some new options.
IAEA Suspects Iran of Nuclear Weapons Work (2/19/10) A new report by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests extensive evidence of Iranian nuclear weapons development activity. The leaked report claims that such activity continued "beyond 2004;" it thus counters the 2007 American intelligence assessment that Iran halted weapons work in 2003. Iran of course denies that it seeks nuclear weapons. Ayatollah Khamenei has repeated that use of nuclear weapons is against Islam. Iran's IAEA ambassador claims that the evidence is fabricated. More ominously, he states that Iran finds IAEA requests for more inspections to be unacceptable. The report is likely to raise tensions and give momentum to Western efforts to apply new sanctions to Iran; the bold engagement envisioned by President Obama appears to be all but dead. Read more and follow developments under Current News Links. IAEA Board Reports on Iran going back to 2003 can be found on the IAEA's Iran page; the new report has not yet been posted.
Imperfect Information = Imperfect Predictions (2/12/10) Stephen Walt is usually a good read, but his piece yesterday in Foreign Policy is a must-read. Walt, in clear and pithy fashion, explains the dilemma that all Iran analysts face in understanding and predicting events in that country. Despite one's best efforts to assess what is going on in Iran, the lack of information requires all pundits and prognosticators to show some restraint and humility. For their part, readers should beware any analyst who speaks in absolutes and claims certainty about Iran's present or future. Any such claims are likely based on an agenda or on intellectual dishonesty.
Sanctions Developments (2/12/10) While attention was focused on Iran's anniversary celebrations yesterday, the United States was taking steps to enhance its sanctions policy toward the Islamic Republic. Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman introduced a bill that would target individuals involved in human rights violations; this would complement sanctions targeting Iranians implicated in Tehran's nuclear efforts. The Executive Branch also took action. The Treasury Department imposed sanctions under existing statutes against four companies associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Anniversary, Repression, and a Stalled Nuclear Program (2/11/10) Today is the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran, an occasion for regime believers to indulge in defiance of the West. This year's anniversary celebrations are buttressed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's claim that Iran has successfully enriched its first batch of uranium to 20 percent. Iran's nuclear program is a major symbol of both its defiance of and supposed technological parity with the West. But Iran's nuclear enrichment may not be going very well. Many headlines about Iran today are concerned with Green Movement protests. This is indeed an important day in Iran's political saga. The regime appears to have been largely successful in preventing massive demonstrations. Green Movement leaders have reportedly been harassed and even attacked, including Mehdi Karroubi. But arguably the most important story of the day (from the American standpoint, anyway) is a Washington Post article discussing a new report on Iran's technical difficulties enriching uranium. Iran's efforts to enrich on a large scale are apparently being hampered by outdated equipment, poor planning and execution, and even sabotage. Evidence of such problems, drawn largely from three years of UN data, is being compiled and analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security. In short, there may be significantly less progress behind Ahmadinejad's bluster than previously thought. Read more about the nuclear issue and protests under Current News Links.
Iran Likely Stalling, Playing Diplomatic Divide and Conquer (2/6/10) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated earlier this week that Iran would have "no problem" after all sending some of its uranium abroad. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated yesterday at a security conference in Munich that a deal was close to send Iranian uranium abroad. Unfortunately, the Iranians are offering very few details of what this supposedly close deal looks like. As Western diplomats sense, this week's developments are most likely just disingenuous diplomatic maneuvering on Tehran's part. Iran's statements are probably timed to stunt progress toward new sanctions by driving a wedge between China and the West. The timing is right for such a strategy. France, one of Iran's biggest critics, assumed the presidency of the UN Security Council this week, and the United States finds itself in a row with China over new arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, the United States Senate last week passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act - a complement to the House's Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act. It is important to note that passage of these bills does not mean that new US sanctions have been implemented; the bills must be reconciled and then be enforced by a somewhat reluctant Obama administration. Still, momentum is growing in the US for unilateral sanctions, and the most recent and ostensibly hopeful comments by Tehran may be intended to influence the debate in the US as well as at the UN. It is indeed harder than ever to gage what exactly is going on in Iran's halls of power. It is possible that Iran's calculations have shifted; yet if it is truly interested in reaching agreement on a uranium transfer, it needs to be more proactive in offering specific proposals. Iran's penchant to speak in platitudes and vague terms does not aid the effort to achieve diplomatic solutions. The West is right to be wary of Iran, but it should not yet go so far in the direction of cynicism that it renders escalated confrontation a self-fulfilling prophecy. It should keep probing Iran for specific alternatives in order to either reach a solution or demonstrate beyond a doubt the emptiness of Iran's diplomatic overtures. For more coverage of these issues, see Current News Links.
US Intelligence Believes Iran Seeks Nuclear Breakout Capability (2/2/10) Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair delivered today to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the US Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment. The report includes the IC's latest assessment of nuclear developments in Iran (see p 13 of the report; p 14 of the pdf). The report states that Iran continues to develop "various nuclear capabilities" that would allow it to build a weapon should it choose to do so. In other words, the IC believes Iran seeks a nuclear breakout capability. It does not assess that Iran intends to weaponize at this point: "We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." The report repeats the finding of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in the next few years. The 2010 report also maintains the pre-existing judgment that Iran's decision-making on its nuclear program is driven by a cost-benefit calculus that provides the international community the opportunity to influence Tehran.
Regime Change - How Will It Happen? (1/27/10) Sentiment appears to be growing in American discourse that regime change in Iran is highly possible and ought to be the focus of the Obama administration. This is perhaps normal given human nature and all that Iran has done to threaten US interests and offend humane sensibilities. But is it analytically sound? As wonderful as 'regime change' may be, no one advocating it has made remotely clear how it will happen. US-Iran-Relations.com attempts to add some sober causal analysis to all of the assertions and wishful thinking in the new editorial analysis 'Regime Change' In Iran - How Will It Happen?
P5+1 Crawling toward New Sanctions (1/17/10) The P5+1 (including the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) met in New York this weekend to discuss possible next steps in international sanctions against Iran (see New York Times article here). Very little appears to have come of the meeting, thanks largely to China. China sent a low-level diplomat to the meeting and maintains that it opposes new sanctions on Iran - at least for now. The conditions under which China would support sanctions remains unclear. Meanwhile, Russia appears to have grown especially frustrated with Iran and amenable to an enhanced sanctions regiment. This is significant given past Western doubts about Russian reliability in putting the squeeze on Tehran. Russia also supports continued efforts at negotiation. The outcome of this most recent meeting, then, is a continuation of a dual-track policy whereby the P5+1 will persist with attempts to achieve a negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear program (Track One) while simultaneously cultivating sanctions options (Track Two) for relatively quick application once they deem that negotiations have failed or need a coercive boost. It is unclear at what point the P5+1 will choose to finally bring sanctions to bear. It also remains unclear what the next steps are in negotiations. There may indeed be active diplomacy behind the scenes, but there is currently little in the public domain to suggest optimism for an imminent nuclear deal.
New Resource Added (1/14/10) US-Iran-Relations.com has cataloged a new resource that users of this site are sure to find interesting. Booz Allen Hamilton, a highly respected consulting firm, runs a Center of Excellence dedicated to Iran affairs called Persia House. Persia House offers professional analysis of Iran's domestic political and economic and international affairs. The new Persia House website can be accessed here.
US Adjusts Approach to Nuclear Issue (1/8/10) The Obama administration's year-end deadline for nuclear diplomacy has quietly passed. The political turmoil and violence in Iran has captivated audiences and dominated headlines so far in 2010. Some reporting suggests erosion at the core of the Islamic system and the emergence of a coherent Green Movement platform. Analysis by others, including Stratfor and Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, suggests caution in writing the obituary of the clerical regime. We are certain to see more political fireworks in Iran in 2010 (the next large demonstrations will most likely occur in conjunction with the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution next month). Yet the outcome of these demonstrations is patently uncertain. Meanwhile, a quiet evolution appears to be taking place in American strategy toward Iran and its nuclear program. Secretary of State Clinton stated earlier this week that there is in fact no hard-and-fast deadline for nuclear negotiations, though the US will continue to cultivate various sanctions options. Why such newfound patience and flexibility? Has Obama been bluffing all along? Does the US lack the will or the diplomatic leverage to punish Iran? Not necessarily. According to the New York Times, senior Obama administration officials believe that Iran's nuclear efforts have suffered significant setbacks, and that Tehran will not achieve a nuclear breakout capability for another 18-to-36 months, thus permitting more time for measured diplomacy. According to "top advisers" in the White House, Iran's nuclear efforts have been hampered by the revelation of the Qom enrichment facility, by old and unreliable centrifuge designs, by domestic political turmoil, and even by sabotage. Enrichment operations at the vast Natanz enrichment facility have dipped 20 percent since the summer due to technical problems. These developments have apparently convinced the Obama administration that it need not rush to a nuclear denouement; there is time to watch political events further unfold in Iran and to craft targeted sanctions that work synergistically with the efforts of the Iranian opposition movement to successfully coerce Iran's key regime elements. The US remains concerned about Iran's nuclear program despite its difficulties with enrichment. The same New York Times article revealing Iran's technical difficulties reports that the Obama administration no longer accepts the finding of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that Iran ceased nuclear warhead design efforts in 2003. New intelligence appears to have brought the Obama team closer to the position of allies such as France, Germany, and Israel that Iran continues its weaponization efforts. This itself is worthy of bold headlines. Still, Obama favors a measured approach for now. Read more and follow future developments under Current News Links.
New CNN Resource (1/5/10) CNN.com recently launched a useful website dedicated to the protests and domestic political turmoil in Iran. View it here.
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